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ABSTRACT
Inthe l93Os, Dunlop and Tarshia observedthat the correlation between
hoursand wages is close to zero. This classic observation has become a
litmus test by which macroeconomic models are judged. Existing real business
cycle models fail this test dramatically. Based on this result, we argue
that technology shocks cannot be the sole impulse driving post-war U.S.
business cycles. We modify prototypical real business cycle models by
allowing government spending shocks to influence labor market dynamics in
a way suggested by Aschauer (1985), Barro (1981, 1987) and Kormendi (1983),
This modification can, in principle, bring the models into closer conformity
with the data. While the empirical performance of the models is signif-
icantly improved, they still fail to account for the Dunlop-Tarshis obser-
vation. Accounting for that observation will require futher advances in
model devlopment. Consequently, we conclude that theory is behind, not
ahead of, business cycle measurement.
Lawrence J. Cttristiano Martin 5, Eichenbaum
Research Department Department of Economics
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Northwestern University
250 Marquette Avenue 2003 Sheridan Road
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480 Evanston, Illinois 602081- Introduction
This paper assesses the quantitative implications of existing REC models for the
time series properties of real wages and hours worked using postwar aggregate US data.
We find that the single most salient shortcoming of RBC models lies in their predictions
for the correlation between real wages and hours worked. Existing RBC models predict a
correlation between real wages and hours that is well in excess of .9. The actual correlation
which obtains in the aggregate data is roughly zero.
The ability to account for the observed correlation between real wages and hours
worked is a traditional litmus test by which aggregate models are judged. For example
Dunlop (1938) and Tarshis' (1939) critique of the classical and Keynesian models was based
on the implications of those models for the correlation between real wages and
employment. Both models share the common assumption that real wages and hours lie on
a stable downward sloped marginal productivity of labor curve.t Consequently, they
predict, counterfactually, a strong negative correlation between real wages and hours
worked.2 This conflict between theory and evidence stimulated a great deal of research
activity. For example, Lucas (1970) suggested that the puzzle could be resolved by
modeling variations in the rate of capital utilization. Modigliani (1977)andPhelps and
Winter (1970) explored the potential of noncompetitive behavior to account for the
DunIop—Tarshis observation, while Barro and Grossman (1976) actually abandoned
equilibrium theories altogether.
In contrast to the classical and Keynesian models which understate the correlation
tIn Keynes'ownwosds; "Thu. I am not disputing this vital fact which the classical economists have
(rightly)assertedas indefeasible. Ina givenstate of organisation, equipment andtechnique,the real
wageearned by a unitof labour has aunique(inverse) correlation with the volumeof employment."
(Keynes f1964,p.17].)
2Subsequent investigations, which tended to corrohorate the Dunlop—Tarshisfindings, includeBodkin
(1969), Lucas (1980), Geary andKennan (1952), Schor (1985), and BUs(1985).Summarisingthis
evidence,Fischer (1908,p.31O) concludes "...the weight of the evidencebynow is that the real wage is
slightly procyclical."between hours worked and real wages, existing REC models are inconsistent with the
Dunlop—Tarshis observation because they grossly overstate that correlation. The reason for
this failing can be best understood by recalling that, according to existing RBC models the
onlyimpulsesgenerating fluctuations in aggregate employment are stochastic shifts in the
marginal product of labor. Loosely speaking, the time series on hours worked and real
wages are modeled as the intersection of a stochastic labor demand curve with a fixed labor
supply curve. It is therefore not surprising that these theories predict a strong positive
correlation between real wages and hours of work.
In view of the traditional interest in the IDunlop—Tarshis observations it is
surprising that they have played so little role in the recent debate about RBC models.1
Instead, attention has centered on the observation that hours are very volatile relative to
real wages.4For example, Fischer (1988) claims that the degree of intertemporal
substitution required to render RBC models consistent with this fact exceeds what is
plausible based on micro studies, In contrast, Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) argue
that, given sufficiently large nonconvexities in labor supply, it is possible to reconcile
infinite intertemporal substitution at the level of the representative agent with any degree
of intertemporal substitution on the part of individual agents at the microeconomic level.
Nevertheless it is still the case that these models assume that the only impulse to business
cycles are shifts to labor demand.Consequently, RBC models which incorporate
nonconvetties in labor supply are also grossly inconsistent with Dunlop—Tarshis type
1Two important exceptions sic Kennan (1988) and Barro and King (1984).
4Two models of aggregate fluctuations, those of Lucas (1977) and Taylor (1980), specify a constant teal
wage, in recognition of this fact.
2observations.5
One strategy for reconciling RBC models with Dun.lop—Tarshis type observations is
to find measurable economic impulses that shift the labor supply function.' With impulses
impacting on both the labor supply and demand functions there is no a priori reason for
real wages and hours worked to display any sort of marked correlation. To us, an obvious
candidate for a labor supply shifter are shocks to government spending. By ruling out any
role for government spending shocks in labor market dynamics, existing REC models
implicitly assume that public and private consumption have the same impact on the
marginal utility of private spending. Aschauer (1985), Barro (1981, 1987) and Hall (1980)
arguethat when $1 dollar of additional public consumption drives the marginal utility of
private consumption down by less than does 1 of additional private consumption, then
shocks to government consumption in effect shift the labor supply curve. Coupled with
diminishing labor productivity, these type of impulses will, absent technology shocks,
generate a negative correlation between hours and the real wage in RBC models.
Our empirical results indicate that shocks to government purchases do have an
important quantitative impact on the performance of RBC models- Accounting for these
shocks helps generate additional volatility in hours worked relative to the volatility of
output and the real wage. Moreover, we find that letting government consumption play a
role in labor market dynamics has at least as large an impact on the empirical performance
5Although Prescott (1986) and Kydland and Prescott (1982) never explicitly examine the hours/real wage
correlation implication of the RBC, Prescott (1986) nevertheless implicitly acknowledges that failure to
account -for the Dunlop—Tarshis observation is the key remaining deviation between "economic theory"
and observations. He states (p.21): "The key deviation is that the empirical labor elasticity oioutput is
less than predicted by theory." Denote the empirical labor elasticity by s. By definition, 77 5
p(y,n)uy/un,where p(i,j) is the correlation between i and j, u is the standard deviation of i, y is log
detrended output and n is log hours. Simple arithmetic yields p(y—n,n) =[27-4flCn/Cy.n).1f—as
Prescott claims—the magnitude of Cn /Cy.n in the RUC is empirically accurate, then saying that the-
RBC overstates 17 ii equivalent to stating that it overstates p(y—n,n). We argue below that this
corcelitiou is exactly the same as the hours worked/real wage correlation implied by existing RBC
models.
tAn alternative strategy is pursued by Bencivengs (1987), who allows for shocks to labor suppliers'
preferences. Shapiro and Watson (1988) also allow for unobservable shocks to the labor supply function.
Sof RBC models as does allowing for nonconvexities in labor supply of the type stressed by
Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988). At the same time, oar results suggest that actual
government consumption has not been sufficiently volatile in the post war US. to
significantly offset the sources of positive correlations between hours worked and the real
wage embedded in existing RBC models. We reached this conclusion by incorporating
government shocks into prototypical RBCs in a manner consistent with Aschauer, Barro
and Hall. We find that under these circumstances the correlation between the real wage
and hours worked still exceeds .6.
Our results leave us puzzled as to why households choose such large variations in
hours given the time series properties of real wages. We suspect that Lucas may have been
correct when he wrote:
Observed real wages are not constant over the cycle, but neither do
they exhibit consistently pro— or countercydical tendencies. This
suggests that any attempt to assign systematic real wage movements
a central role in an explanation of business cycles is doomed to failure.
(Lucas [19811, p.226.)
Our analysis indicates that existing RBC models fall prey to this (less well known) Lucas
critique. Since we believe the Dunlop—Tarshis puzzle will ultimately be resolved by further
developments in theory and not by more refinements in data measurement, we, unlike
Prescott (1986), conclude that theory is behind, not ahead, of measurement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe a
general equilibrium model which nests as special cases a variety of existing RBC models.
In section 3 we discuss our method of assigning parameter values to the model. Section 4
presents our central result, namely, the difficulty existing RBC models have in accounting
for the Dunlop—Tarshis observations. Throughout, we measure the real wage by labor's
average productivity rather than, for example, average compensation rates. We do this for
several reasons. First, existing RBC models imply that the shadow wage is proportional to
average productivity, so the two should be interchangeable for the calculations we perform.
4Second, this paper is concerned with the implications of aBC models for shadow wage rates
and these need not coincide with average compensation rates. In particular1 RBC theories
do not imply that wages actually paid and labor services coincide in time. In any event,
our empirical results are not very sensitive to whether wage or productivity data are used.
Using average productivity data, we obtain essentially the same results as Dunlop and
Tarshis, who used wage data. Section 5 contains concluding remarks and suggestions for
future research. In Appendix A we examine the correlation between real wages and hours
worked as measured in existing RBC studied, eg., Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Hansen
(1985).Using this data set we find a substantial negative correlation between the
variables. We show that these results are consistent with the view that they reflect the
impact of measurement error and that the true correlation is close to zero First, when we
adjust the raw correlation under the assumption that the hours data are mismeasured in
the way suggested by Prescott (1986), the results are considerably closer to zero. The
second source of measurement error we consider is the misalignment in the coverage of the
hours and output series used in existing empirical RBC studies. When the coverage is
aligned by considering only the private business sector, then the correlation between wages
nd hours worked is also close to zero.
52. Two Prototnâcal Real Business Cycle Models
In this section we present two prototypical real business cycle models, both of which
assume steady state growth is generated by exogenous technical change. The first model
corresponds to a stochastic version of the standard one sector growth model (see, eg.,
Kydland and Prescott [lDSO,p.174],) The second model corresponds to a version of the
model considered by Hansen (1985) in which labor supply is indivisible. In addition to
allowing for random shocks to the aggregate production possibility set, we relax the
implicit assumption in existing RBC models that public and private spending have
identical effects on the marginal utility of private consumption.Under these
circumstances, government shocks have a nontrivial impact on the labor market.
2.1, The Models
Consistent with existing real business cycle models we assume that the time series
on the beginning—of—period t per capita stock of capital, kt, private tine t consumption c,
and hours worked at tine t, nt, correspond to the solution of a social planning problem
which can be decentralized as a Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium. For pedagogical
purposes we consider the following planning problem which nests both RBC models as
special cases. Let T be a positive scalar which denotes the time t endowment of the
representative consumer and let 'y be a positive scaJar. At time t the social planner ranks
streams of consumption services, c, leisure, T—n and pubhcally provided goods and
services,according to the criterion function:
(2.1) E0#{ln(c) + 7V(T-n) +
6where (•)issome quasi concave function. We follow Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985)
and Barro (1981,1987) in supposing that consumption services are related to private and
public consumption as follows:
(2.2) e =4' +ag,
where a is a parameter which governs the sign and magnitude of the derivative of the
marginal utility of 4'withrespect to When; &= 1,then 4'andg have identical effects
on the marginal utility of 4'.For!values: of aléss than 1,. a unit increase indrives the
marginal utility of 4'downby less than does a unit increase in 4'..Whena =0,has no
effect, and when a c0an increase inincreases the marginal utility of 4},iThroughout
this paper we assume that agents viewas an uncontrollable stochastic process.
Consequently we are free to set ()a0 without affecting the competitive equilibrium.
We consider two specifications for the function V(.). In what we refer to as the
divisible labor model,V(.)is given by,
(2.3) V(T_nt) =ln(T—n1)for all t.
In what we refer to as the indivisible labor mode4 V(.) is given by
(2.3)' V(T—n1) =(T_n)for all t.
There are at least two interpretations of specification (2.3)'. First, it may just reflect the
assumption that individual utility functions are linear in leisure. The second interpretation
builds on the assumption that there are indivisibilities in labor supply. Ifereindividuals can
7When a is negative, then for suitable choice of 4(S)themarginal utility of g is positive. 83long83
7either work some positive number of hours or not at all. Rogerson (1988) shows that a
market structure in which individuals choose lotteries rather than hours worked will
support a Pareto optimal allocation of consumption and leisure. The lottery determines
whether individuals work or not. Under this interpretation (2.3)' represents a reduced form
preference ordering over hours worked which can be used to derive the Pareto optimal
allocation using a fictitious social planning problem. This is the specification used by
Hansen (1985) who notes that it is consistent with any degree of intertemporal
substitutability of leisure at the individual level.
Per capita output,is produced using the Cobb—Douglas production function
2 4 —(an I— . Iy
where0 c0 .c 1andis an aggregate shock to technology. We suppose thathas the
time series representation
(2.5) z =
whereis a serially uncorrelated lid process with mean A and standard error o. The
national income identity is given hy
(2.6) c + gj + kt+I —(1_o)ktS
according to which per capita consumption and investment cannot exceed per capita
output.
At date 0 the social planner chooses contingency plans for {c, kt+l, n: t ￿ O} to
mahimize (2.1) subject to (2.4) —(2.6)and (2.3) or (2.3)', k0 and a law of motion for
8which remains to be specified. Before continuing it is useful to substitute out several of the
constraints. First, because of the nonsatiation assumption implicit in (2.1) we can, without
loss of generality, impose strict equality in (2.6). Using (2.2), (2.4) an4 this version of (2.6)
we obtain the following planning problem for the divisible Labor economy:
Maximize
(2.7) B0 ;d$t[ln{(zn)(1_9)k+ (1—6)kt _kt+l + (c-_1)g] +
subject to k0 given and a law of motion for g1 to be specified, by choice of contingency
plans for {kt+i, nt: t ￿ 01.
The corresponding planning problem for the indivisible labor economy is:
-
Maximize
(2.7)' BOLflt{ln[(ztnt)(1)kf+ (1—0k1 _k1+j + (l)gJ +
subject to Ico given and a law of motion forto be specified, by choice of contingency
plans for {k+i, nt: t ￿ 0}.
2.2Stationary Reprentations of the Model
Before discussing the solutions to the two models, it is convenient to represent the
social planning problems (2.7) and (2.7)' in a different manner. These alternative,
equivalent, representations have the property that all of the planner's decision variables
converge in nonstochastic steady state. We refer to these alternative representations as the
"stationary representations" of the two models.
9It is convenient to define the following detrended variables:
(2-8) kt+i =kt+i/zt1t =Yt/ZtE =c/z =g/z1.
The variables with a bar over them are well defined because > U for all t. To complete
our specification of agents' environment we assume that t evolves according to
(2.9)ln(it) =(l—p)ln(j)+ $n(t1)+
whereln() isthe mean of ln(it), II<1 and1st
is the innovation inln(jt) with standard
deviation CgNotice that hastwocomponents, z and.Movementsin the former
give rise to permanent changes in the level of government consumption, whereas
perturbations in the latter produce effects which die out at a geometric rate, and so are
temporary. With this specification, the factors that give rise to permanent shifts in
government spending are the same as those which permanently enhance the economy's
productive ability.






For the divisible labor model,
ici(2.12) r(nt1kt,k+i,jt.xt)=
{ln{nt(1_MlfexP(_eAt)
+ —t+i+ (&_1)j] + 7ifl(T_n)}.
For the indivisible labor model,
(2.12)'r(nEt,kt+t,,A1) =
{ln[nc1—qex(—o.\
+ exp(—A1)(l—oWt +(a.-1)] +




Consequentlythe original planning problems for the divisible and indivisible labor
economies are equivalent to the social planning problems of maximizing (2.10), subject to
(2.9)and (2.12) and (2.12)' respectively.
Since the date t state variables in (2.10) areF,and ,thesolution to both
problems is a set of functions;
(2.13) kt÷1 =flkt,it,AtI
(2.14)n1 =
11The solution to the original problems of interest are then given by kt+l =ztfjkt,,At]and
=
2.3Approximate Solutions.
The only case in which it is possible to obtain an analytical solution for the models
just discussed is when a =5 = Iand the function V(.) is given by (2.3). This case is
analyzed in, among other places, Long and Plosser (1982). For general values of a and 5
analyticalsolutions are not available. Here we use Christiano's (1988b) log linear
modification of the procedure used by Kydland and Prescott (1982) to obtain an
approximate solution to our social planning problems. In particular we approximate the
functions f and q by decision rules that solve the linear quadratic problem obtained by
replacing the function r in (2.12) and (2.12)' by a function ft which is quadratic in ln(n),
ln(Ft), ln(Ft+i), ln(jt) and X. The function ft is the second order Taylor expansion of
r[exp(A1),exp(A2),exp(A3),exp(A4),A5]aboutthepoint{A11A21A31A445] =
[ln(u),ln(k),ln(E),ln(),A).Here n and F denote the steady state values of n andin the
nonstochastic version of (2.10) is obtained by setting o =Cg = 0.
It follows from results in Christiano (1988b) that the decision rules which solve this




12In (2.15) and (2.16) rk,dk,ek,rfldn and e are scalar functions of the models' underlring
structural parameters.0
The approximate decision rules (2.15) and (2.16) are appealing for a number of
reasons. First, for sufficiently small values of the vector (aAcg) and for (k1,it) sufficiently
dose to (k,j) relations (2.15) and (2.16) approximate (2.13) and (2.14) arbitrarily well.
Second, for the case in which a =5= 1 and V is given by (2.3)' the log linear
approximation is exact. Third, Christiano (1987b,1988a) studies versions of our models in
which a =1 and 8isdose to zero and shows that the log linear approximation is quite
accurate.
2.4 The Dynamic Effects of Government Spending Shocks.
Notice that, when a =1,the only way in which c andenter into the social
planner's preferences and constraints is via their sum, c +Thus, exogenous shocks to
induce one—for—one offsetting shocks in c, leaving other variables like y1, kt+1 and nt
unaffected. This implies that the coefficients dn and dk in the planner's decision rules for
kt+l and nt both equal to zero. Consequently, the absence of a role forin existing RBC
tAt this point, we can give some indication as to why the Kydland—Preacott linear approximation is
inappropriate in our context. Their method delivers an approximation to the ((unction in (2.13) that is
linear in its arguments, ie., it is a function At+a3(A—.A), say, where Thus, the
implied approximate decision rule for k+1 is f, where f=ztiexp(At)[Ar+a3(At—A)]. Since the linear
approximation is arbitrarily accurate for At—Asufficientlyclose to zero, it follows that for such values of
At—A,(ispositive sad increasing in At—A.However,since al is negative (in the stationary version of
the model, a pesiiiveperturbationin Atisa negslive technology shock and a positive innovation to
capital depreciation), it follows that (must become negative for At—Asufficientlylarge. This
non—monotonicity in f has the implication that a large technology shock induces a fall in capital
investment and, via the resource constraint, a surge in private consumption. Chrstiano (1987a;1988b,ftn
9,ls) documents that these perverse dynamics are sufficiently large, even for plausible shock variances, to
significantly distort second moment properties. It is easily confirmed that the log—linear approximate
decision rule for kt+t implied by (2.15) is monotone in At—A.Thekey feature of our context that
accounts for the difference between the log—linear and linear approximations is our model for s, (2.5).
When etismodelled as covariance stationary about a deterministic trend (as is done implicitly in
Kydland and Prescott [1992] and Hansen [1955[, see footnote 15), then results in Christiano (1988a)
suggest that the difference between the log linear and the linear approximations is small.
13models can be rationalized by the assumption that a =1.
In simulation experiments with our models, we found that reducing a below 1
increases du so that hours worked become more responsive to movements inThis in
turn reduces the correlation between hours worked and average productivity. In addition,
we found that this correlation is systematically affected by the parameter p which governs
the serial correlation of shocks to The longer lasting these shocks are (ie., the larger p
is) the larger is dn and the smaller is the predicted correlation between hours worked and
average productivity. We now discuss the intuition behind these results.
To understand the role played by a, consider the following suboptimal, benchmark
policy in which the planner responds to shocks in jbyleaving all labor market variables
unchanged. Formally, under the benchmark policy: Vn5 =Vy5=
Vks+l=0for s
where V signifies the response of the associated van able to a shock in Feasibilityof this
policy requires Vc =—Vg55 ? t, 50 tbat,
(2.17) Vc5 =(a—1)Vg.
To see why this benchmark policy response is suboptirnal when a C 1, it is useful to focus
on the first order condition requiring that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption equal the real wage:
(2.18) MFLu'(c) =7V'(T—n1).
Here, u(S) is the period utility function of consumption services (u(•) =log(.))and MPLt
is the marginal product of labor with MPLt When a c1
the benchmark policy implies that an exogenous jump in government spending produces a
rise in u'(c) by reducing consumption services. From (2.18), we see that the benchmark
policy cannot be optimal because it implies that the marginal utility of leisure is less than
14the marginal return to working as measured by MPLtu'(ct). The rise in hours that is
actually optimal assures the equality in (218). Relative to the benchmark policy, this
involves a lower value of MPLt and, when V is given by (2.3), a larger value of
Notice that the smaller is a, the larger is the initial increase in w(ct) associated with a
given increase in 1t under the benchmark policy. Consequently, the sensitivity of n to
rises as a falls.Finally, becausehas no direct effect on the production function, a
smaller a also implies a larger negative response of productivity.. We conclude that by
magnifying the opposing movements in hours and productivity associated with a shock in
smaller values of a lead to a smaller correlation between these two endogenous
variables.
To understand the role played by the degree of permanence in exogenous
government shocks it is useful to consider the two extremes: p =0,1. In the first case, the
effect of a shock tolasts only one period. Concavity of the utility function suggests that
households will accommodate the one period increase inwith a small increase in nt and a
small decrease in c sustained over a number of periods. The increased y1 and reduced c
in the period of the shock, along with a small reduction in capital investment, make room
for the government spending shock. Future periods' reduced c and increased y permit
the increased investment required to gradually return the capital Etock to its unchanged
steady state growth path. This reasoning suggests that when p =0,dk c 0 and d > 0,
but small in absolute value.
The negative income effect associated with a permanent increase incauses steady
state nt and kt to increase. By itself, the smoothing motive associated with the concavity
5We find that d0 is larger when V(S) is linear in T—nt than when it is deEmed by (3.3), This is not
surprising since in this case V'(T—nc) has no role to play in restoring equality in (3.18) reLatJve to the
benchmark policy. Put differently, the indivisible labor model increases the income effect on leisure by
reducing the income effect on consumption to
15of the planner's preferences now induces a strongpositiveresponse of hours worked.tQ The
immediate response is even larger. This follows from the well known property of the one
sector growth model that adjustment of capital to steady state is not insta.ntaneous.
During the transition period, when capital is below its steady state growth path, hours
worked is above its steady state value. This is the reason why the intital response of hours
worked to a permanent increase inis even larger than the steady state response. This
reasoning suggests that the larger p is the larger dn and dk are, with the latter eventually
becoming positive.Finally, because of the small short term response in the stock of
capital, the large increase in n generates a large fall in average productivity. With larger
values of p generating larger values of dn we expect a smaller correlation between hours
worked and productivity.
t0j our models the steady state rate of inteest is independent of j,asis i/n. It follows that j=
where 'iiindependent of g, so that a useful, unit free measure of the income effect on a is given by the
output multiplier, d/dj.Aftertouts algebra, it can be shown that, for the divisible labor economy,
di—a n
—= • a= —, a1(a)= —
dgas+ai(a) y yT—n
Here, a and ai(a)areindependent of g. In thecaseof a0,thisis because it is 1 minus the ratio of gron
investment to output, which is determinedby i/n.In the case of a1, this is because ')a1(a) is the
product of the steady state marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and nfl',
neither or which i. related to j To evaluate the magnitude of the output multiplier, we replaced c11fi,
j/ and n by their poet war sample averages, .55, .177, and 320.2, respectively. In addition, we set T =
2190,the number of hour. in a quarter. The output multiplier is approximately linear in a with slope
—1.2. For the following values of m 1.0, 0.5, 0.0, —0.5, —1.0, —1.5, the output multiplier is,
respectively, 0.00. 0.60, 1.22, 1.86, 2.53, 3.22.
163. Assigning Values to the Models' Parameters
-
Inthis section we describe our strategy for assigning values to the models'
parameters. These are estimated using Hansen's (1982) Generalized Method of Moments
(0MM) procedures. Apart from the balanced growth implications we do not impose any of
the models' overidentifying restrictions. We proceed this way because a variety of authors,
including Mankiw, Roternberg and Summers (1985), Altug (1986), Christiano (1988b) and
Hichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) have already rejected, using formal statistical
methods, versions of the RBC models discussed in section 3. Here we are more interested in
documenting the models' performance along specific dimensions. Our 0MM strategy
amounts, in practice, to requiring that the model fit selected first moments of the data. In
this sense the procedure is consistent with the way in which Prescott (1986) uses growth
observations for pinning down values of a subset of his model's parameters. As it turns out,
our 0MM estimates are essentially identical to those obtained using the procedure
described in Christiano (1988b) which chooses values for the struàtural parameters that
equate an approximation of the models' first moment implications with appropriate sample
moments of the data. An important advantage of the 0MM procedure is that we can
obtain standard errors for our point estimates.
3.1 Methodology




Throughoutthe paper we assume that T equals 2190, the total number of hours in a
17quarter and set the parameter L9 a priori so as to imply a 3% annual subjective discount
rate, i.e. fi =(1.03)25.
Consider the parameter 6. Let dkt denote gross investment at time t. According to
our model, dkt =Ikt+i—(1_45)ktl,so that,
(3.2) 6 =1—
dkt/kt_kt÷i/kt.
Letdenote the unconditional mean of the time series [1 —dkt/kt_kt+i/kt], so that,
(3.3)E{64 —(1 + dkt/kt —k+i/k)}=0.
*
Weidentify 6 with a consistent estimate of the pa.rameter 5
The time t first order necessary condition for capital accumulation in our models
states that the time t expected value of the marginal rate of substitution of goods in
consumption equals the time t expected value of the marginal return to physical
investment in capital,
(3.4)' Et{/r'c+i/ct —[9(y1/k11)+ 1 —ôJ}=0.
rt Ibliows from (34)' that
(34) E{f'ct+ it —E0(y+jftt+1)+ 1 —= 0.
This is the moment restriction that underlies our estimate of 9.
The time t first order necessary condition for hours worked require that the time t
expected value of the marginal productivity of labor times the marginal utility of
consumption equals the time t expected value of the fictitious representative consumer's
18marginal disutility of working. Given our assumptions regarding the aggregate production








(I—O)[y/n1]/jcV' (T_nt)]. so that
(3.7) E{y _(t_O)yc1n1/V'(T—nt)} =0.
*
Weidentify with a consistent estimate of the parameter 'y
Given a value of 0 we can compute a time series on the Solow residuals z using the
(2.4) and observations on (y,nk). Let A anddenote the unconditional expected value
and standard error of the time series process At= l(zt)—
1"@t_i)By assumption,





Oln(k)/(1_6)]and A is the first difference operatorJ'








All of our models imply the testable restriction that
(3.14) X=PcP=My=Pk=Mg•
Given our assumptions regarding the stochastic process generating government
ttIn section 3, we specified At to be iid, whereas an empirical estimate of this quantity seems to display
negative first order autocorrelation. (This is also reported in Prescott [1986].) We nevertheless set the
theoretical first order autocorrelation of A to zero because, as documented in Christiano (1987d,1988b),
our models predict that the autocorrelation of Alog(yj) closely matches that of At. However, empirically
Alog(yt) has lag one antocorrelation roughly equal to .36. Given that our models cannot accommodate
at the same time both the serial correlation properties of At and it, we thought it a reasonable
compromise to go half—way in matching both, by setting the theoretical autocorrelation of At to zero.






Since c/c_1 contained in agents' time t information setrelation (3.4)' implies
that
(3.16) E{/r1ct+ifct — +1 —o]}(ct/ct_1)=.
Thisunconditional moment restriction can be exploited to estimate a.
in order to discuss our estimation procedure it is convenient to define the vector
valued function
(3.17) 1=frt+ i/ct ,c/c_11k+ t/kt.Yt+ i/kt +
and the parameter vector,
(3.18)4' =
[45*J9,7*1Apt7Ap1LcpjLyjAkjtg,pJcglck1•
Withthisnotation we can summarize (3.3),(3.4), (3.7) —(3.13), (3.15) and(3.16)as
(3.19)EH[Xt+i,1IJJ =aV t 0,
for4' =4,,
thetrue parameter vector. Here, H(.,)is the 13x1vectorvalued function
whose 13elementsare:




























canbe calculated given a sample on {X: t=1,2,...T+1}. Both our models imply that XH1
is a stationary and ergodic stochastic process. It follows from results in Hansen (1982) that
can be estimated by choosing that value of 'I', say WT, that minimizes the quadratic
criterion
(3.22) 3T =
22where WT is a positive definite matrix that can depend on sample information.
Hansen (1982) also shows that the estimator which results in the minimum
asymptotic covariance matrix of T is obtained by choosing to be a consistent
estimator of
(3.23) H0 k=_cu[(t+f1(t+1)
Proceeding as in Hansen (1982) we can estimate H0 by replacing the population moments
in (3.23) by their sample counterparts evaluated at WT. In order to guarantee that our
estimate of H0 is positive definite we use the damped truncated covariance estimator
discussed in Eichenbaum and Hansen (1988). The results we report were calculated by
truncating (3.23) after 6 lags. Since we have exactly thirteen parameters and thirteen
unconditional moment restrictions, the minimized value of the criterion function will be
exactly equal to zero. This simply reflects the fact that we are not imposing any
overidentifying restrictions on this version of the model.
The restrictions on the growth rates summarized by (3.14) can be tested by taking
the difference between the minimized valne of the criterion (3.22) when the restrictions are
imposed and the minimized value of the criterion when the restrictions are not imposed.
The latter value is equal to zero in our case. The same distance matrix should be used for
both runs and should be a consistent estimate of H0 even when the restrictions are not
satisfied. The resulting test statistic which we denote ST is distributed asymptotically as a
Chi—square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions being tested.
In practice we found it very difficult to estimate ainconjunction with the other
parameters of the model, in the sense that our estimate of a depended sensitively on the
initial starting values for a. Consequently we estimated the remaining 12 elements of P0
under two alternative assumptions: private and publicly provided consumption goods are
23completely nonsubstitutable (a = 0) and perfect substitutes (a = 1.0),respectively.In
both cases we simply simply deleted H from the moment conditions being investigated.
3.2 Data Description
Private consumption, c, was measured as quarterly real expenditures on
nondurable consumption goods plus services, plus the imputed service flow from the stock
of durable goods. The first two measures were obtained from the Survey of Current
Business. The third measure was obtained from the data base documented in Brayton and
Mauskopf (1985). Government consumption, g, was measured by real government
purchases of goods and services minus real government (federal, state and local)
investment.'2 A measure of government investment was provided to us by John Musgrave of
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This measure is a revised and updated version of the
measure discussed in Musgrave (1980). Gross investment, dkt, was measured as private
sector fixed investment plus real expenditures on durable goods plus government fixed
investment. The capital stock series, kt, was chosen to match the investment series.
Accordingly, we measured kt as the stock of consumer durables, producer structures and
equipment, plus government and private residential capital plus government nonresidential
capital. Gross output, wasmeasured as c plus g1 plus dkt plus time t inventory
investment. Given our consumption series, the difference between our measure of gross
output and the one reported in the Survey of Current Business is that ours includes the
imputed service flow from the stock of consumer durables bnt excludes net exports. Our
measure of hours worked correspond to the one constructed by Hansen (1984). The data
21t would be desirable to include ing a measureof the service flow from the flock of government
owned capital, since government capital is included in our measure of kt. Unfortunately we know of no
existing measures of that service flow. This contrasts with the case of household capital, for which there
exist estimates of the service flow from housing and the stock of consumer durables. The first is included
in the official measure of consumption of services, and the second is reported in Brayton and Mauskopf
(1985).
24were converted to per capita terms using an efficiency weighted measure of the population
(see section 2). All series cover the period 1955,3 —1983,4.For further details on the
data, see Christiano (1987c).
Several first moment properties of the data are reported in Table 3 under the
heading "U.S. Data".'5 Of particular interest are the mean growth rates of per capita
private consumption, output, investment and government consumption. According to these
pointestimates, 'k > PcP> /Ay > Pg withuu 1.88%, /Scpu 1.80%,py= 1.60%randscg =
.92%on an annualized basis. The estimated value of the annualized growth rate in per
capita hours worked is .08 percent, roughly zero.
While the point estimate of average growth in government consumption seems
problematic from the perspective of the model the estimated standard error of lAg is quite
large. Consequently we formally tested the hypothesis:
(3.24) PcP'yt'kt1g
using the 0MM procedure for testing parameter restrictions described above. The resulting
value ofwhich is asymptotically distributed as a CIti—square with 3 degrees of freedom,
equaled 2.69, with corresponding probability value .56. Thus this test yields very little
evidence against the balanced growth hypothesis. We interpret these results with some
caution since our test assumes the growth rates are constant throughout the sample. In
fact, the low average growth rate inappears to reflect the fact that, beginning in the
early 1970s, government consumption began to occupy a shrinking share of For
example, the annual growth rate of g averaged 2.8 and —.7 percent in the periods 1956,3 —
1969,4and 1970,1 —1984,1respectively.
tandard erroru in Table 3 were estimated using an exactly identified version of the 0MM procedure
described in this section. The analogue to the martix Ro (defined in 13.231) which is required to calculate
standard errors was estimated in the waydescribedimmediately following equation (3.23) in the text.
25The first four columns of Table 1 report point estimates and standard errors for the
various versions of the model which we consider. The first two columns report results for
the case in which private and public consumption are perfect substitutes (a =1.0). The
third and fourth columns report results for the case in which private and public
consumption expenditures are completely nonsubstitutable. In all cases we imposed
restriction (3.14) which was tested using the GMM procedure discussed above The
resulting value of ST which is asymptotically distributed as a Chi—square with 4 degrees of
freedom, equaled 3.24, with corresponding probability value .48. Thus we found very little
evidence against the growth rate implications of the modeL
Notice that the parameters are estimated with small standard errors. In order to
assess implications of our point estimates for the first moments of the data we simulated
the models given the values of the structural parameters reported in Tahle 3 and generated
1000 simulated time series, each of length 113. First moments were calculated on each of
the data sets. The numbers reported in Table 4 correspond to the average sample moment
across the different data sets. As can be seen all four models do extremely well in matching
the subset of first moments investigated.
264. Emnirical Results
This section investigates the quantitative properties of our models. We are
particularly interested in their implications for the Dunlop—Tarshis observations and the
volatility of real wages and hours worked. We document that the RBC models with a =1
are unable to account for the Dunlop—Tarshis observations. In addition they understate
the volatility of hours relative to wages as well as the volatility of hours per se. We then
allow government spending to play a nontrivial role in labor market dynamics hy setting a
=0.This change generates a substantial improvement in the models' implications for the
volatility of wages and hours. ilowever the implications of the models remain spectacularly
at variance with the Dunlop—Tarshis observations.
Our methodology for investigating these issues is as follows. In section 3 we reported
estimated values for the structural parameters of our models. Using these we solved for the
equilibrium laws of the system exploiting the methods discussed in section 2 and simulated
synthetic time series for the endogenous variables using government and technology shocks
drawn from a Normal random number generator. Finally we computed selected second
moments using the simulated data sets and compared them to analog moments computed
using the actual post war US data.
Table 2 reports the coefficients of the equilibrium laws of motion for and nt
for the four versions of the RBC model described in section 2. Since these are used to
generate the synthetic time series that are the basis of our quantitative analysis it is useful•
briefly to discuss their qualitative properties. Recall that the coefficient en denotes the
response of ln(n) to an innovation in the technology shock. All of the models which we
considered imply that nt depends positively on At. When a =I,en equals .36 and .48 in
the divisible and indivisible labor models, respectively. When a =0,en equals .45 and .59
in the divisible and indivisible models, respectively. Evidently, as explained in Hansen
(1985), indivisibilities in labor supply increase the sensitivity of honrs worked to
27movements in the technology shock. Reducing a also increases e. This reflects our
specification that a positive technology shock drives up government spending (ie.,=
Otherthings equal, this induces an increase in the number of hours worked (see
section 2.) A larger value of en increases the conditional volatility of hours worked and
reduces the conditional volatility of real wages. The latter effect arises because of
diminishing returns in the production technology. These considerations suggest that
indivisibilities in labor and a nontrivial role for g in the labor market will be useful in
accounting for the unconditional labor market volatility observations.
According to Table 2, when a =0the coefficient dn which represents the elasticity
of n1 with respect to t' equals .21 and .28 in the divisible and indivisible labor models,
respectively. '4Assuggested by the intuition in section 2.4, the magnitude of these
elasticities reflects in part the high degree of persistence in the exogenous government
spending shock, p. For example, in the a =0version of the models, when p is set to zero,
then dn =.018and 025 in the divisible and indivisible labor models, respectively.'5 The
positive sign on these elasticities implies that increases in government consumption due to
an innovation in p generate increases in hourG worked. Thus, other things equal, p shocks
generate opposing moves in average productivity and hours worked. By increasing the
quantitative magnitude of this effect! the high estimated persistence of government shocks
(p =.97)improves the models' chances of matching the Dunlop—Tarshis observations.
Table 4 reports the implications of the different models for various second moments
14The intuition underlying the fact that d0 is larger in the indivisible labor economy ii discussed lit
footnote9.
addition, dk was —.0154 and —.0150 in the divisible and indivisible labor models, respectively. All
other parameters in our approximate decision nile. are functionally independent of the value of p.
28of the data.'° Table 4A reports results obtained using data which have been transformed
using the Hoclrick/Prescott filter. Table 48 reports the analog results obtained using the
Growth 1 and Growth 2 filters. For each of our four models we generated 1000datasets,
each of length 113, using the parameter values reported in Table 1, The data sets were
then processed using the Hodrick/Prescott, Growth 1 and Growth 2 filters.Second
moments were calculated using each of the transformed synthetic data sets. The.numbers
in columns 2 —5in Tables 4A and 4B correspond to the average second moments across
each of the transformed 1000 synthetic data sets. Associated numbers in parentheses are
standard deviations, across data sets. -Thenumbers in the last column of Tables 4A and
48 are the indicated empirical second moments. The associated numbers in parentheses
are the corresponding empirical standard errors.
First consider the results in Table 4A. We measure the volatility of a variable, say
x, by its standard deviation, which we denote All of the models do well at matching
the volatility of output and the volatility of consumption and investment relative to
output. In contrast, all do poorly at matching the volatility of hours worked relative to
output. To see this compare the ratio of an/cry generated by each of the models with our
point estimate of un/cry. For the versions of the divisible and indivisible labor models in
which a equals 1, this ratio equals .41 and .50 respectively. For the corresponding models
t5Point estimates and standard errors for the U.S. data reported Tables 4A and 4B were obtained in the
following manner. Let JLjandcrj denote the mean and standard error of variable i.First, the
unconditional moment condition. E(xt—s&t)=0 and El(xjt_$LQ2(Cj/Ul)2_(xjt_(tj)l]=O were used to
estimate pj and criJ a1 (and their standard errors). This was done using an exactly identified version of
the GMM procedure described in section 3. Next, let Pij denote the unconditional correlation between
variables i and i Then the unconditional moment restrictions E(xtt—pt)=O, E[(xj—p2—ci2]=O and
were used to estimate the parameters Pt, pj, c, Cj, and Pij.Thiswas
done using an exactly identified version of the GMM procedure described in section 3. In all cases the
analogue to! the matrix R0 (defined in [3.231) which is required to calculate standard errors was estimated
in the way described immediately following equation (3.23) in the text.
29in which a =0,this ratio equals .54 and .64, respectively. These results indicate that
indivisibilities in labor supply generate additional volatility in nt, as does accounting for
random movements inwhen a =0.Interestingly, the quantitative impact of the latter
perturbation to the base model (divisible labor, a =1)is actually larger than the former
perturbation. In fact the divisible labor model with a 0 outperforms the indivisible labor
model with a =1.Nevertheless all of the models seriously underpredict the volatility of
hours worked by over 25%.
Next we investigate the volatility of hours worked relative to the volatility of
average productivity. To do this we compare the ratio of an/cry/ngeneratedby each of
the models to the estimated value of Cn/Cy/n which obtains in the data. When a equals 1,
the divisible and indivisible labor models imply that this ratio equals .67 and .96
respectively. Thus, when a =1the model understates Un/Cy/fl regardless of whether labor
is divisible or not. When a =0this ratio equals 1.01and1.42 respectively. Consequently,
letting g1 play a role in labor market market dynamics improves the models' ability to
account for the empirical value of an/cry/n. Notice that the model with a =0and
indivisible labor actually otserstates ny/n• One obvious way to correct this problem is
to increase a. However, this causes the model to understate an/cry even more seriously.
At this time we note that our results differ in an important way from Hansen's
(1985), which are also based on data processed using the Hodrick/Prescott filter. He
reports that the indivisible labor model with a =1implies a value of U/Cy/ equal to 2.7
(see Hansen [19851, Table 1.) This exceeds the corresponding empirical quantity by over
220%. In contrast, our version of this model underpredicts an/cry/n by over 20% (see the
column in Table 4A labelled "Indivisible Labor"). The reason for the discrepancy is that
Hansen chooses to model innovations to technology as having a transient effect on
whereas we assume its effect is permanent. One way of viewing these differences lies in
their implications for the growth process. According to onr model,y/n,kt, ct and
grow on average, hut they have no tendency to return to a trend in levels. This reflects our
30assumption that log z is a random walk with drift. In contrast, Hansen (1985) models z,
as an AR(1) process with a root that is less than one (.95). As stated his model does no
accommodate steady state growth.'1 Not surprisingly the intertemporal substitution effeci
of a shock to technology is considerably magnified in Hansen's version of the model.
We now investigate whether our RBC models are capable of accounting for th
Dunlop—Tarshis observations, i.e we look at the models' implications for the correlatior
between average productivity and per capita hours worked. From Table 4A we see that al]
of the models which we considered fail dramatically along this dimension. The correlatior
between average productivity and hours worked in the data equals —.20 whereas when ii =
1 both the divisible and indivisible labor models predict a correlation in excess of .90. It
t7There is an interpretation of Hansen's work according to which he implicitly assumed that growth
follows a geometric trend. Under this interpretation, the model he worked with is the stationary version
of a model with the following instantaneous preference function and resource constraint: Iog(c) + v(n),
and cc ÷ kt+i —(l—S)kt= qtw1nkf yt. Here we is a stationary shock and the economy's gross
quarterly growth rate is q> 1. The stationary version of this modal has instantaneous preferences and
* SSI i—B) *9 * a
resource constraint: log(ct) + v(nt) and c + (i—S )kt = qtn (k1)yt. Here, 61 —(i—S)q
and starred and unstarred time series variables are related as follow.: x =xJqt.Evidently,thinking of
the model Hansen actually wrote down as the stationary representation of an underlying nonstationary
model requires reinterpreting his depreciation rate and technology shock, and thinking of consumption,
capital and output in hi. model as having been geometrically detrended. The latter i. of no operational
significance in the context of his paper, since Hansen only studiea the Hodrick/Prncott cyclical
component of the logs of variables. This is invariant to prior geometric detrending (ie., the cyclical
a
component of log rt is identical to the cyclical component of log It,) For example, had he simulated
* *
artificial observations on y and then looked at the cyclical properties of log qty1 his results would have
been unchanged. Under our interpretation, he reports the cyclical properties implied by the model for
log y;. Regarding the depreciation rate and technology shock: First, Hansen assumes S = .025 so that
if—as seems ampisically reasonable—we assume q = 1.004, then the implied value of S is .021. Also,
the shock in the underlying nonstationsry economy is expressed in terms of 'i as follows:
Hansen chose the statistical properties of 'it as follows. First, using data on y, ot, and ke and setting B
= .36. he computed a time series of qt and decided it is well approximated as a linear AR(t) process
with autoregressive parameter .95. Assuming q = 1.004, this implies a linear AR(1} representation for 'it
with autoregressive parameter .95, after rounding to two digits. The mean of 'it was arbitrarily set to 1
and its innovation variance was chosen to equate the standard deviation of cyclical log ye with the
corresponding empirical quantity. In this way, by suitably reinterpreting variables, one is free to think of
Hansen as having analysed an economy with geometric growth in which the rate at which a unit of per
capita capital depreciates is .021. The latter depreciation figure is virtually identical to the one that
emerged from our empirical analysis (see Table 1.)
31Appendix A we argue that this probably overstates the mismatch between model and data
for measurement error reasons, and that the true aggregate correlation may well be closer
to zero.Either way, there is no doubt that the model substantially overstates the
correlation between hours and wages. This is not surprising in light of the fact that the
only shocks driving the labor market dynamics in these models are shifts to the aggregate
technology. Ageuts work more precisely because the returns to working are higher. In
contrast when a equals 0, disturbances tocan induce movements in hours worked. Since
the marginal productivity of labor is a declining function of hours worked and the
aggregate technology does not shift in response to an increase in public consumption,
increases in g simultaneously generate an increase in n and a decrease in average
productivity. Consequently the models which assume a = 0 generate correlations between
ln(nt) and ln(y/n) which are smaller than those which obtain when a = 1.Nevertheless
even here both models predict correlations in excess of .60. Evidentlyis not sufficiently
volatile to overcome the strong positive correlation between hours worked and average
productivity induced by the assumed technology shocks.'8 By making a sufficiently
negative, (i.e. he marginal utility of c is increasing in gt)' it is possible to substantially
decrease the predicted correlation between y/n and Unfortunately doing this results
in a private consumption series (c) whose volatility is grossly counterfactual. In addition,
'5Not surprisingly, a lower value of p hurts the models' abilitytoaccount for the Dunlop—Tarshis
observations. When p = 0 and a = 0, the implied correlation between ln(nt) and In(yt/n) is .94 and
.90 for the divi.sibleandindivisible labor models, respectively. With regard to u,/ Cy the models imply
.48 and .57,.respectivcly. Similarly, with regard to Cn/Cy-si, they imply .89 and 1.27. Evidently1 along
thee dimensions, reducing the magnitude of p has the same effect as keeping p large, and raising the
value of a toward unity.
t5To investigate the effect of a negative, we set a = —2, T = 2190, fi= p = .96, a .0176,
a = .020 in the indivisible labor modeL In addition, we rhose y, g, 8,0, Aso that, in steady state,
n = 320.5, gJy=.176, c1/y = .55, k/y = 10.59 and dlog(y} = .004. This resulted in the following
decision rule parameters: r = .94, d = .011,= —.94, r,, = 86, dn = .89, e, = .86. We simulated
the model in the same way as the models in the text and found Ccp/Cy = .71 (.04), a/cr = .97 (.06),
2.37 (.49), and corr(y—n,n) = —.12 (.16) (numbers in parentheses are standard error!.)
32this causes cr/o,1 to substantially overshoot its empirical counterpart.
The results in Table 4E which correspond to the Growth 2 filter are in many ways
similar to those reported in Table 4A. First, all of the models substantially understate the
volatility of the growth rate of per capita hours worked relative to the growth rate of
output-The magnitude of the shortcomings of the models along this dimension i
quantitatively much larger when we work with the Growth 2 filter than with the
Hodrick/Prescott filter, Second, the base model greatly understates the volatility of the
growth rate of hours worked in relation to the growth rate of average productivity. At the
same time, the other versions of the model actually overstate the volatility of the growth
rate of hours to the growth rate of average productivity. As before, the most salient failure
of the models is that they generate correlations between the growth rates of average
productivity and hours worked that are strikingly counterfactual. In the US data this
correlation equals approximately —.72 while all of the models predict that this correlation
ought to exceed .65. As with the volatility of hours worked the failure of the models along
this dimension is more striking when the data are processed with the Growth 2 filter as
opposed to the Eodrick/Prescott filter.
Next we consider the results reported in Table 4B which are obtained using the
Growth 1 filter. The entries in Tables 4B which differ because of the filter used are those
pertaining to 0'n'0, 0n1'y/n and corr(y/n,n). The corresponding results obtained with
the Growth 1 filter are denoted hy Cns/ffy Cn*/Cy/n and corr(y/n,n) respectively.
Consistent with the Hodrick/Prescott and Growth 2 filters, our results with the Growth 1
filter indicate that the models substantially underpredict the relevant measure of Cfl/CTy
Interestingly, all of the models overpredict the volatility of the log level of houis relative to
the growthrateof average productivity. As before all of the models fail to reproduce even
the sign of the correlation between the relevant measure of average productivity and hours
worked.
Viewed as a whole our results are consistent with the view that the most striking
33empirical shortcoming of existing REC models lies in their implications for the correlation
between average productivity and hours worked. We conclude that the pwzzle faced by
real business cycle theories is the classic one long faced by business cycle theorists: how
can we explain the fact that per capita hours worked display such marked fluctuations
when real wages and average productivity do not display a marked positive correlation?
34S. Concluding Remarks
Existing REC theories assume that the only sourceofimpulses to post war US
business cycles are exogenous shocks to technology. We have argued that this feature of
these models generates a strong positive correlation between hours worked and average
productivity. Unfortunately, this implication is grossly counterfactual, at least for the post
war US.
Of course, documenting the empirical shortcomings of existing R}3C models on a
particular dimension of the data does not constitute evidence in favor of alternative
paradigms. -fact,we believe RBC models are useful starting points for business cycle
analysis. Nevertheless, our results indicate an important failing which must be remedied
before it can be plausibly claimed that theory is ahead of measurement. It simply seems
unlikely that better measurement alone will lead us to conclude that the correlation
between hours and real wages is above .9, as existing RBC models imply.
'To us it seems more likely that the reconciliation of theory and fact will come from
identifying other disturbances, in addition to technology shocks, which impact on aggregate
labor markets. In this paper, we have explored the potential role for shocks to government
spending.Using a specification suggested by the work of Aschauer (1985), Barro
(1981,1987) and Kormendi (1983), we find that government shocks, when parameterized in
an empirically plausible way, can go only part way in accounting for the Dunlop—Tarshis
observations. Either our model of government spending needs to be modified, or additional
disturbances need to be incorporated into the model.
One obvious measureable shock is a disturbance to the supply of money. In Lucas
(1972), an unperceived increase in the aggregate money supply causes agents to mistakenly
believe that they face a temporary increase in the real wage. This induces an increase in
aggregate hours worked and, due to diminishing marginal productivity, a decrease in the ex
post real wage. In this way, monetary shocks can be expected to act very much like
35government shocks Ifl Our model in counteracting the sources of positive correlation
between real wages and hones worked captured by existing real business cycle models.
Constructing empirically tractable models of this type will be a challenging task.
Other sources of disturbances have been identified in the literature and also seem
promising to us- For example, Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) model the
impact of disturbances to the relative price of capital goods, while Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1988) investigate the role of human. capital shocks.
Finally, we hope that our discussion of the role of government spending constitutes
an independent contribution of the paper. One important finding is that the date t impact
on output and employment of a date t government spending shock is much larger if it has a
lot of persistence than if it is temporary. In particular, given the high empirical degree of
persistence in government shocks, we find that the implied elasticity of hours worked with
respect to an exogenous shock to government spending is roughly 1/4- When instead the
persistence of the shocks is set to zero the elasticity drops to less than I/40
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40Appendix A: The Cyclical Behavior of Aggregate Pseductivity.
For the data set described in text, the correlation between aggregate hours worked
and productivity is negative (see Tables 4A and 4B.) In this appendix we show that this
result holds true for other measures of aggregate hours worked and output. We then argue
that the sign of this correlation probably reflects two sources of measurement error. The
first source of measurement error is that the aggregate output data cover more sectors than
does the aggregate hours data. Another factor that can account for a downward bias in the
productivity/hours correlations is measurement error in the hours data. We conclude that,
most likely, the true correlation between average productivity and hours worked is weakly
positive.Overall we view our results as being consistent with the Dunlop—Tarshis
observations.
A.1 The Cyclical Behavior of Productivity in the Aggregate Data
The Aggregate Data
Our first measure of aggregate hours worked, denoted N1, corresponds to total hours
worked by wage and salary workers in non—agricultural establishments as reported by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics(BLS).20 The BLS obtains its information by a mail
25The establishment hours data refer to hours of all employen—production workers, nonsupervisory
workers, and salariedworkers—and are basedlargely on ntahliahrnent data. An establishment is defined
as an economic unit which producesgoodsor services, such as a factory, mine, or store. The employment
statistics for government refer tocivilianemployeesonly. Formore details, see Handbookof Methods
(1988). The establishment hours data we used are the sum of government (HRSGOV) and private
(IIRSPST) hours worked, where names in parentheses are the Wharton Econometric Forecasting
Associates (WEFA) mnemonics. The data can also be found in the "total" row of Table C—S of
Employment and Earnings (lSBS,p.ll2).
41questionnaire which solicits information about employment status over the payroll period
that includes the 12th day of each month-2t Since this measure reports total hours paid for
by employers, it includes total hours of paid vacation and sick leaves. Our second measure
of aggregate hours worked, denoted N2, corresponds to total hours worked in
non—agricultural industries as calculated by the Bureau of the Census for the BLS. This
data is based an household interviews obtained from a sample survey of the population 16
years of age and over.22 Unlike N1, this measure covers actual hours worked, rather than
hours paid for. For moie details on these measures of hours worked, see Employment and
Earnings (1988,pp.157—184). Our third measure of hours worked, N3, was computed by
Gary Hansen (1984) who converts the household data on aggregate hours worked (N2) to
efficiency units by weighting the different age—sex categories on the basis of the different
groups' average wages in the 1970's. Hansen motivates this transformation by a desire to
correct for a presumed discrepancy between actual aggregate labor services and aggregate
reported hours worked when there is non—trivial labor heterogeneity.
Aggregate hours worked, N1 and N2, were divided by the total US population to
obtain the per capita measures of hours worked, H1 and H2.23 The latter corresponds to the
hours worked measure used in Kydland and Prescott (1982).Hansen's measure of
aggregate hours, N3, was divided by a measure of the quality adjusted working age
population which was obtained using the same procedure underlying the construction of
2tAn exception is Federal Government workers, for which the hours data represents the number of hours
paid for on the last day of the calendermonth(see Handbook of Methods 11985].)
22The data were obtained by multiplying persons at work (NAWTTTONAGU) with average hours
(NH'ITTNAG_U), where names in parentheses ace the WEFA data mnemonics. The persons at work
data can also be found in the "nonagricultural industries" column of Tahle A—27 in Employment s-nd
Earnings (is8 5,p.33) and the average hours data can be found in the "total at work" column of Table
A—29inEmployment and Earnings (l985,pi4). The product of average hours and persons at work was
seasonally adjusted hy the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
3Our population series is total U.S. population including armed forces overseas, with WEFA data
mnemonic Nfl,
-
42N3. (See Christiano (1987cJ for details.) The resulting series on hours worked per quality
adjusted working age person is denoted by H. This measure of per capita hours worked
was used in the text and in Christiano (1988b).
Initially we consider three measures of aggregate real output. The first measure, Y1,
consists of quarterly real GNP divided by the total US population and corresponds to the
output measure in Kydland and Prescott (1982). The second measure, Y2, consists of
quarterly real CNP divided by the quality adjusted working age population. Our third
measure of output, '1, consists of quarterly real GNP minus net exports plus an estimate
of the services produced from the stock of durable goods obtained from Brayton and
Mauskopf (1985). When divided by the quality adjusted working age population, this
measure corresponds to the concept of output used in the text and in Christiano (1988b).
Our first two measures of average labor productivity, P1 and P2, were obtained by
dividing quarterly real GNP by N1 and N2 respectively. Our third measure of average
labor productivity, P3, was obtained by dividing quarterly real GNP by Hansen's measure
of aggregate hours worked, N3. Our fourth measure of average productivity, P4, was
obtained by dividing Christiano's measure of output by Hansen's measure of aggregate
hours worked and is the measure used in the text.
Not surprisingly, all of our measures of per capita average productivity display
marked trends, as do afl of our measures of per capita hours worked, except the one
compiled by Hansen. Accordingly some stationary inducing transformation of these data
must be adopted. We report results for three such transfbrrnations here. The first
transformation (Growth 1) is motivated by the fact that all of the structural models
considered in this paper imply that the first difference of the logarithm of average labor
productivity, the logarithm of per capita output and the logarithm of per capita hours
worked are stationary stochastic processes. Second, we report results using the first
differences of the logarithms of per capita hours worked, output and average productivity
(Growth 2). Third, we report various correlation for data which have been transformed
43using the HP detrending procedure discussed in Hodrick and Prescott (1980) and Prescott
(1986). Our use of this transformation is motivated by the fact that many authors,
including most prominently Kydland and Prescott (1982,1988), Hansen (1985) and Prescott
(1986) have investigated RBC models using data which have been filtered in this manner.
Moreover, King and Rebelo (1988) show that the HP filter involves first differencing, so
that the structural models in this paper imply that—apart from endpoint effects—HP
filtered data re covariance stationiry.
The Correlations
Table Al summarizes our results for certain combinations of the different measures
of output and hours worked. Column 1 reports results for the Growth 1 transformation;
column 2 reports results for the Growth 2 transformation of the average productivity and
employment data. Finally column 3 reports the analog correlations computed using the
output of the HP filter applied to the logarithmic levels of the raw data. The portions of
Table Al marked "Estabhshment", "Household", "Hansen'1 and "Christiano" reflect
calculations based on {H1,Y1,P1}, {H2,Y1,P2}, {H3,Y2,P3} and {H3,Y3,P4} respectively.
The key featu±e of the results is that, for all measures of hour worked and output, the
correlation between per capita hours worked and average productivity is negative. This is
true regardlesi of which stationary inducing transformation is applied to the raw data or
which sample period is investigated.
Productivity Is, and Is Plot, Proc yclical
A notable feature of the results in Table Al is that productivity appears to be
eountercycical when the cycle is measured by hours worked, and strongly procyclical when
the state of the cycle is measured by output. This is striking in view of the conventional
44belief that hours worked and output are interchangeable as measures of the state of the
cycle. This belief is based on the fact that output and hours are strongly positively
correlated. For example, for the period 501—87,4, the correlation between Y1 growth and
H1 growth (Growth2) is .75.The apparent inconsistency can be accounted for
algehraically by the fact that hours worked are very volatile relative to output. To see how
high volatility of hours could account for corr(y/n,n) < 0 and corr(y/n,y) > 0 even though
corr(yn) > 0, it is useful to express the first two correlations in terms of the third and the
relative volatility of hours worked.This is done by exploiting the definition of a
correlation and rearranging terms:
(A.1) corr(y—n,n) =_______ — 1]
(A.2) corr(y—n,y) =_____ — corr(y,n)]!__
wheredenotes the standard deviation of (log detrended) variable i) Log detrended
average productivity is represented as y—n because the log transformation converts the
ratio of output to hours to the difference between the log of output and the log of hours.
From these formulas it is evident that if corr(y,n) =1,then—not surprisingly—the
correlation of productivity with the cycle is the same whether the state of the cycle is
measured by hours worked or output.However, in the empirically relevant case
corr(y,n) ci,onecan have corr(y—n,y) > 0 and corr(y—n,n) <0 if, and only if,
(A.3) corr(y,n) c
24Relaticn (A.!) is Juit the relation p(y—n,n) =(?1i)(c/cr.n)
discuned in footnote 5.
45and
(A.4) corr(y,n) <(11)1
Conditions (A.3) and (A.4) are equivalent with corr(y—n,n) c0and corr(y—n,y) >0,
respectively. In the case ofand H1 and the Crowth2 transformation, Un/Cy =.82,so
that (A.3) and (A.4) are satisfied. It is clear from (A.3) that high relative volatility of
hours is required for corr(y—n,n) <0.Condition (A.4) indicates that that volatility cannot
be too high if corr(y—n,y) >0is to occur.
£2 Measurement Error and the Aggregate Productivity/Hours Correlation.
There are at least two reasohs to believe that the negative correlation between
productivity and hours in the aggregate data reflects measurement error and that the
actual correlation is closer to zero. One potential source of distortion lies in the fact that
the output data covers more sectors than does the hours data. Another possibility is that
the results reflect measurement errors in the hours data. We consider these two
possibilities in turn.
MLsa.tignment in Hours and Output Coverage
That misalignment considerations may account for the negative productivity—hours
correlation in aggregate data is suggested by results in Table A2. That table presents
results for the same statistics and sample periods as in Table Al. The first panel, labelled
"non—farm business productivity", reports results based on the output and hours series
46underlying the BLS's productivity data. The BLS's output series cover about 3/4 of ON?,
and omit value—added originating in agriculture (1.7%), government (10.7%), non—profit
institutions (3.4%), and owner—occupied housing (5.8%)." (Numbers in parentheses are the
ratio to GNP in 1983, and were computed from the numbers in Tables 1.7 and 1.23 in
Survey of Current Business [1987].) The BLS's hours series are the establishment hours
worked data which corresponds to their output measure.
The results in the Growth 2 and HP columns of Table A2 differ notably from the
corresponding results in Table Al. For both detrending procedures and for all but one
sample periods the correlation between productivity and hours worked is nonnegative in
Table A2. A distinguishing feature of the results in the first panel of Table A2 is that care
has been taken to assure that the underlying output and labor input measures correspond
to the same sectors. This suggests the possibility that the results in Table Al reflect
misalignment in the underlying output and hours series.In an effort to improve the
alignment in the data underlying the results in the first panel of Table Al, we adjusted the
output measure used there by subtracting value—added in farming and non farm housing
from GNP.2& Let denote that measure of output after dividing by the total US
population. Also, let P5 denote the ratio of GNP minus value—added in farming and non
farm housing to establishment hours worked, N1. The calculations in the second panel of
25For details of the BLS's definition of non—farm business output, see Bsndbook of Methods (1988).
The 3/4 estimate in the text approximates the BLS measure of output by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis' measure of value added in the non—farm lees non farm housing business sector of the GNP
accounts (see, for example, Table 1.7, line 5 in Survey of Current Business [1987].) There is a slight
upwardtrendintheratio of non-farm less housing business output to GNP, In the early 1950s it was
around 72%. whereas by1987 ithad reached 77%.Thedata used to produce the results in the first
panelofTable A2 were taken from the Federal Raserve Board of Governors' database. The hours index
has data mnemonic JHNFB and the output index data mnemonicisJQNFB. These data can also be
taken from the output and hours rows in the Nonfarm Business Sector panel in Table C—ti) of
Employment and Earnings (l988,p.ll3).
2tAccording to Table 1.1 of Survey of Current Business (1987), value—added in nonfarm housing was
7.8% of GNP in 1983. According to Table 1.23 in the same source, in 1983 75% of nonfarm housing was
imputed value—added from owner—occupied housing, with the rest deriving from tenant—occupied
housing. We obtained our farm (XAF82) and non-farm houaing (XEAFE82) output from the Board of
Governors' data base, where the expressions in parentheaes are the data mnemonics.
47Table A2 are based on {H1,Y4,P5}. Note how much closer the Growth 2 and HP
correlations between productivity and hours are to zero than the corresponding numbers in
the first panel of Table Al. To us, this evidence suggests that the strong negative
correlations in Table Al reflect the absence of hours worked in farming and
owner—occupied housing from N1 and N2.27
Megsurenunt Errors In Hours Worked
Prescott (1986) has argued that, to a first approximation, the establishment (N1)
and household (N2) hours data can be viewed as independent measures of aggregate hours
worked. Suppose we assume, as does Prescott (1986), that the measurement error in these
two time series are orthogonal to each other and to the logarithm of the underlying true
process.Then a consistent estimate of the variance in actual hours worked is the
covariance between the establishment• and household measures of hours worked. In
addition we can estimate the variance of the change in true productivity hy the covariance
between any two measures of average productivity which are constructed using different
measures of hours worked. Finally we can estimate the covariance between true average
productivity and per capita hours worked by calcu'ating the covariance between any two
measures of these objects which are assembled using different measures of per capita hours
worked.
In Table AS we report the results of calculating the correlation between average
productivity and hours worked using this alternative procedure as applied to our different
data sets and our three stationary inducing transformations. In all cases our output
measure is GNP minus value—added in farm and non farm housing. First, note that all the
correlations based on HP detrcnding are now strongly positive. For example, when the
THours worked in the tenant—occupied housing sector are included in the real estaLe component of
establishment hours.
-
48Gary Hansen and Establishment measures of hours are crossed, the estimated correlation
between productivity and hours is 44 on the long sample period. The hours/productivity
correlation is somewhat smaller, though still close to zero, when the Growth 2
transformation is used. Overall we conclude that Table A3 does provide some evidence in
favor of the hypothesis that part of the negative correlations reported in Table Al can be
attributed to measurement error of the type discussed by Prescott (1986).
49tStandard errors are reported only for estimated parameters.
were set a priori. Apart from y,pointestimates and standard errors are not
sensitive to the value of a.
2E{ansen's 1 statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the growth rates of
at, c, k, and g are identical. The numbers in parenthesis are the
probabilitj, under the null hypothesis, of getting a .3 statistic larger than
the reaiized empirical value.
3Under the null hypothesis, 1-lansen's .3 statistic is a realization from a chi
square distribution with the indicated number of degrees of freedom Cd. of
1.).
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Labor Labor Gov't Govt
11771 11751! 11709 11694
r 0.95 o.gu 0.95 0.94
199.5 200.2 198.9 198.8
0.0 0.0 0.0020 0.0054
—0.95 -0.94 -0.95 -0.94
0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047
n 317.8 317.4 317.5 317.1
-0.36 —0.48 -0.45 —0.59
0.0 0.0 0.21 0.28
en 0.36 0.48 0.45 0.59Table 3
Selected First Moment Properties
MODELS
U.S.2
. Divisible Indivisible Data
Divisible Indivisible with with (1955.4—
Labor Labor Gov't Gov't 1983.4)
c/y 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.003)
0.161 0.182 0.181 0.181 0.177
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003)
dkt/yt 0.267 0.261 0.267 0.267 0.269
(0.009) (0.009) (0,009) 0.009) (0.002)
10.60 10.60 10.58 10-59 10.62
(0.263) (0.258) (0.293) (0.284) (0.09)
317.9 317.6 317.9 317.6 320.2
(3.39) (43) (5.59) (6.59) (1.51)
dlog 0.0048 0.0048 0.00118 0.0048 0.00145
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0007)
dlog t 0.0048 0.0048 0.0018 0.0048 0.00140
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0014)
dlog kt 0.00118 0.00148 0.0048 0.00148 0.0047
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0005)
dlog 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 0.0023
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0017)
dlog nt 0.4E—05 0.6E—05 -0.6E—0S —0.7E-05 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0013)
'Iumbers are averages, across 1,000 simulated data sets of length 113
observations each, of the sample average of the corresponding variable in the
first column. Numbers in parenthesis are the standard deviation, across data
sets, of the associated statistic.
2Empirical averages, with standard errors. See footnote 13 for details.Table 'IA
Second Moment Properties,




























































































'All of the statistics in this table are computed after first logging and then detrending
thedatausing the Hodriok—Prescott (HP) method. a is the standard deviation of variable
I detrended in this way. corr (x,w) is the correlation between detrended a and detrended
'Average of correspondtng statistics in column1,across 1,000 simulated data sets each of
length 113. Number in parentheses is the assooiated standard deviation.
3ftesults for U.S. data. See footnote 16 for details about the standard errors, which
appear in parentheses.Table 46
Second I4oeent Properties1
U.S. Data and Exogenous Growth Kodeis,















a Ia 0.57 0.54 0.47 0.45 0.47 c ' (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.037)
a 2.311 2.44 2.12 2.22 1.96 dk ' (0.15) (0.16) (0.111) (O.T4) (0.097)
5Ia 0.141 0.51 0.54 0.65 1.32 n ' (0.003) (0.004) (0.017) (0.018) (0.14)
a ,Ia 1.07 1.27 1.47 1.67 2.11 n' (0.26) (0.30) (0.38) (0.41) (0.236)
aIa 0.69 1.00 1.03 1.47 0.97 n (yin)
(0.013) (0.024) (0.063) (0.099) (0.05)
I0 . 1.79 2.50 2.78 3.78 1.56 n (yIn) (0.41) (0.54) (0.70) (0.09) (0.216)
oIa 1.75 1.61 1.61 1.46 1.30 g (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.15)
a 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.011 y (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
corr(yln,n) 0.97 0.95 0.74 0.68 -0.72
(0.017) (0.022) (0.041) (0.049) (0.07)
corr (y/n,n') 0.144 0.49 0.36 0.040 —0.30
(0.029) (0.030) (0.074) (0.079) (0.060)
'In this table, c, dk, y, y/n, n refer to the first difference of the log of the indicated
variable. n* refers to the log of hours. Then, a is the standard deviation of variable
i and oorr (t,P) is the correlation between tandP.
2Average of corresponding statistics in colwtin1,across 1,000 sisulated data sets each of
length 113. Number in parenthesis is the associated standard deviation.
3Results for U.S. data. See footnote 16 for details about the standard errors.Table Al
Correlations Using Aggregate Data'
Hours Worked --—yin vs.y—--- ----—----y/n vs. n —-
Measure,
Sampling Period Growth HP Growth! Growth2 HP
Establishment,
Total
50,1-81,4 .50 .32 -.22 -.19 -.16
50,1 -79,4 .47 .30 -.27 -.25 -.20
50,1 -69,4 .36 .20 -.29 -.30 -.32
Household
55,3 -87,4 .39 .40 -.19 -.6) -.19
55,3-79,4 .40 .40 -.25 —.70 -.25
55,3-69,4 .34 .45 -.28 -.68 -.38
Hansen
55,3—84,1 .37 .40 -.26 -.74 -.29
55,3-79,4 .36 .37 -.29 -.78 -.36
55,3-69,4 .29 .42 -.23 -.77 -.45
Christiano
55,4-83,4 .40 .54 -.30 —.72 -.20
55,4-79,1 .38 .51 -.32 -.77 -.23
55,4-69,1 .29 .49 -.23 -.77 -.42
'Sample correlations between output per hour (yin) and per-capita output (y)
and per-capita hours (n). For a discussion of the detrending procedures and
data sources, see the text.Table A2











50,1 -87,4 .63 .59 -+29 .05 .15
50,1 -79,4 .61 .55 -.3) .00 .09
50,1 -69,4 .57 .42 -.23 .00 -.05
GNP-farming-housing
50,1 -87,4 .61 .51 -.22 -.04 .05
50,1 -79,4 .59 .49 -.26 -.10 .00
50,1-69,4 .51 .40 -.28 -.13 —.10
Sample correlations between output per hour (yin) and per-capita output (y)
and per-capita hours (n). For a discussion of the detrending procedures and
data sources, see the text.Table A3
Measurement Error Adjusted Correlations, yin vs. n
yin n Sample Period Growth I Growth2 HP
Household Establish, total 55,3 - 87,4 .26 .03 .33
Establish, total Household 55,3 - 87,4 -.18 -.10 .14
Gary Hansen Establish, total 55,3 - 84,1 -.57 0.06 .44
Establish, total Gary Hansen 55,3 - 84,1 -.19 -0.10 .23
'Correlations between yin and n, where each is computed using a different hours mea-
sure, as indicated in the first two columns. In all cases, the measure of output used 11
GNP minus value-added in farming and non-farm housing. For details about the data and
detrending procedures, see the text.